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THE PROBLEM OF LONG-TIME AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT

Address by H.R. Tolley, Assistant Administrator,
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, at Farmers' Week,
the Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 11 A.M., January 31, 1934

Before this audience, I shall not have to recount step by step our drive for agricultural adjustment to date. I take it that you are familiar with what has been done. I do want, however, to try at the outset with broad strokes, to draw the whole picture together. The main fact is that we had to get some 40 million acres of land retired from production, and that we are now in the midst of forced emergency manoeuvres to that end.

During the World War some 50 million acres in Europe, not counting Russia, went out of cultivation. The United States brought about 40 million more acres into cultivation and geared up its whole farm plant into a higher production. After the war we kept it up. We kept on farming as if there were still great hungry foreign markets crying for our crops. In reality, such markets were rapidly dwindling. The world owed us money; we would not accept goods in return. With our tariff wall as it was, and still is, the only way we could keep up the appearance of a great foreign custom was to lend those other nations more and more money with which to keep on taking our food and fabrics. This is what we did until about 1928. Finally we got sense enough to quit it; the false front of our foreign markets at once collapsed; and we had at last to face the fact that we were farming at least 40 million acres too much land.

Beginning in May of 1933, with the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, we have attacked our problem barehanded employing a number of new methods, the most important of which is the allotment plan. The allotment idea, very broadly stated, is to get that 40 million or more acres of our

national area out of production, including each individual farmer to reduce his plantings a certain percent. The chief means we have thus far employed of inducing such cooperation, is to pay farmers enough Government money to make it worth their while to come in. We are raising this money by processing taxes.

The voluntary allotment method has proved of enormous value. It is enabling us to set up rapidly and democratically the social machinery absolutely necessary to an orderly farm production in this country. At the same time, I think we ought to recognize that our voluntary or induced production control campaigns as now practiced, have probably got to grow into something rather different if they are to last. They are an admirable emergency device; they are doing the business, establishing the essential groundwork for an orderly American agriculture, organized from the ground up to fight its own price battles for itself.

What we are getting for the money we are disbursing in adjustment payments now, is a basic adjustment plainly necessary to our National recovery. Those 40 million surplus acres have been jamming with their products the channels of trade. Our farm surplus output played a part in bringing on the general business paralysis which closed every bank in the land last March. We couldn't go on without planning forever.

Operating largely under the allotment method, we expect by the end of 1934 to have pared 20 million acres, piece by piece, out of our National corn acreage; 15 million acres out of cotton; 7 1/2 million acres out of wheat; and a half-million acres out of tobacco. Add it up, and it comes to 43 million acres of the United States to be taken out of commercial, competitive

production, under the voluntary allotment method, farm by farm, pro-rata, by the end of this year.

That is a tremendous amount of land to take out of use. Forty-three million acres is considerably more than the area of Illinois. It is almost one-eighth of all the cultivated land in the United States. Now, suppose we have by the end of this year reached our goal; suppose we have 43 million acres taken out of the crops I have named, taken out in fields, strips and patches all over the country. Displacement is on the basis of wherever those crops happened to be growing when we launched allotment campaigns. If all these campaigns succeed, we shall experience a measurable relief from the pressure and danger of agricultural surpluses. But we shall still be a long way from making the wisest use of our land.

Our efforts toward land retirement thus far have been, necessarily, an emergency drive to get out a certain proportion of certain crops throughout the country, regardless of whether any given part of the country ought to be growing more or less of the crop in question. Allotted withdrawals under the present system, tend to proceed, crop by crop, without due regard for correct farm management inter-relations, on farms, and by regions. We have made a good beginning, but in so doing, we have plainly let ourselves in for a much longer and much harder job. That is the way of progress. Our largely successful scramble to take out land in patches, and to organize farmers for controlled production, is stimulating a great deal of new thinking. It is making our farmers think in terms of farming together, not against one another. It is creating a multitude of new situations which force us all, as never

before, to think hard and fast. We can't sit around now as we used to and contemplate the dream of a land in order, wisely used. Every day we are doing something which makes it more imperative that we think ahead of the present stage of agricultural reorganization and set up a permanent land program for the long pull.

We are formulating such a program. From reports in the press and elsewhere, you have probably heard something about it. The reports to date have, generally speaking, been so various as to leave one rather confused. One line of comment, especially chosen by a few old-time correspondents, who want to see the New Deal fail, holds that our whole voluntary allotment program has broken down. Consequently, we are said to be dashing into complete compulsion as to farm allotments; and at the same time striding away from the allotment principle altogether, in the direction of large, outright Government purchases and withdrawals of marginal land.

This is a totally incorrect version. We are, at the insistence of a very large farm sentiment, looking for some way to hold in line the non-cooperator; but we are not doing this as dreamers, with our eyes to the stars; we are trying to be realists, with our ears to the ground. We don't want to put too much strain on the traditional American free spirit all at once.

Again, we are pushing as fast as we can toward a more selective retirement of bad land; but we certainly do not see this thing of taking out mean, punishing land in large chunks as a complete substitute for the allotment method. Large-scale land purchase and retirement will be a supplement to, not

a substitute for a planned agricultural production.

We need to develop and have as our goal a comprehensive plan for agriculture as a whole. Such a plan can not be rigid and fixed, but must be flexible enough to meet changes in international and industrial conditions as they arise. It must also provide for as much flexibility and freedom of action, on the part of individual farmers as is consistent with a proper balance between farm production and the demand therefor.

First consideration will have to be given to determining the volume of production necessary to maintain our own population on an adequate level of consumption for food and clothing. Added to this must be the probable volume of farm products that can be sold abroad at remunerative prices. Imports of farm products must also be considered. Account will have to be taken of trends in consumption now under way, of possible future changes in dietary habits, and of the effects of varying levels of business activity and consumer purchasing power.

Next comes an appraisal of our resources, the distribution of our present agricultural production, and the adaptation of the different regions to the production of the various crops and classes of livestock. This appraisal would determine what lands now used for farming had best be used for something else, and what farm lands had best be devoted to less intensive production than at present. The objective will be to develop a regionalized plan, which will result in the desired volume of production and which at the same time will be flexible enough to permit each individual farmer to follow the system best adapted to his conditions.

One immediate refinement, urged upon us recently by a delegation of Southern farm leaders, is summed up in this excerpt from a memorandum they left with us: Allotment requirements should be shifted to encourage balanced systems of farming and not (a) perpetuate disproportionate and unsound farm practices, and (b) penalize farmers who have adopted well-balanced systems between sales crops and others--systems for years recommended by the United States Department of Agriculture.

What our Southern friends were protesting against, in other words, was that at present the farmer who is planting 80 percent of his land to cotton, and the farmer who is planting 10 percent of his lands to cotton, are now both required to decrease their plantings 30 percent. The point is soundly made; we are trying now to figure out some method of "farm unit" allotments. It may in time be necessary, and even more difficult, to refine the allotment system to a point where it encourages, rather than upsets, sound and appropriate shifts and balances in the entire farm management schemes of whole regions. Any longtime program of allotted production must look forward, then, to a single contract or plan for the entire farm. It must look forward to working out plans for major regions, and typical farming systems to be encouraged within those regions.

Many people have felt that it is the so called submarginal land which is largely responsible for our surplus problem, and that if it only were taken out or retired from cultivation that the situation would be corrected.

In an attempt to determine how important the production in such areas really is, Dr. F. F. Elliott, of the Planning Division of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, has made a rough selection of some 25 areas, generally conceded to be the least productive type-of-farming areas in the United States. If all the farm land in these areas were immediately retired

completely from production, a change which of course is neither desirable or feasible, there would be taken out approximately 125 to 140 million acres, or about 14 per cent of our total farm land; which includes about 38 million acres of crop land harvested or roughly 10 percent of that total.

This would reduce corn production about 7 percent; wheat production, 11 percent; cotton production, 11 percent, and hog production 5 percent.

Since in each of these poor regions there are to be found smaller or larger areas of good land, it is probable that the effect of retiring the poorer portions of the areas would not exceed 50 percent of the above figures, and might be even less.

While such a reduction would be of some help in relieving the present excess production, it obviously would not go far in correcting the agricultural surplus problem.

The main reasons for buying such marginal land out of production and keeping it out, are social. Such land does add something to the surpluses; but our main concern with it in an interwoven program of land utilization, is to stop bad land from wasting human lives. A great many farms now being operated condemn the people there, and their children, to worse than peasant standards of living. It would be sensible as well as decent to give such people a chance to sell and move to where they will have a better chance. Not only that; you want such land out of the new economic picture. A closely allotted production on our better lands would, I think, be much easier to operate, and far more effective, if we did not, as now, have to carry along in the general movement, tragically-handicapped, backward, farming people, on marginal and submarginal soil.

Before I go on to indicate how a block retirement of thin, mean land, and a cooperative reorganization of plantings and of livestock breeding


operations on rewarding soils, might reasonably be made to fit together, I ought perhaps at least to indicate that production adjustment is not the only problem which is making us lose sleep in the AAA. We are also trying to hack a new way through the modern jungle of distribution. To this end, the Farm Act places in our hands new weapons: marketing agreements, with licensing provisions, a governmental club behind the door, to beat into line the chiseling ten percent or so who are likely to defeat any agreement among competitors to fit their operations together and wipe out waste. We have made fair, and in some instances notable, progress toward effective agreements as to the marketing of compact, highly specialized agricultural products. The canning peach agreement and the citrus fruit agreements are cases in point. Milk is something else. The industry is widely diffused, and in some areas at war within itself. At the present level of buying power, the dairy business is bursting with contending surpluses. About all that we have shown thus far by our utmost efforts to write milk marketing agreements which will stick is that, without an ordered production, there can be no orderly marketing. We have learned that unless great care is taken in preparing an agreement it is likely to blow up in your lap. We must soon attempt a national program of adjusted milk production.

In addition to marketing agreements, the Triple-A is charged to administer some codes of fair competition under the Industrial Recovery Act. Codes, as you know, are mainly concerned with wages and hours of labor and fair trade practices. As things are now arranged, the Triple-A handles only the codes of industries which have to do with the first processing of farm commodities. That is plenty of codes, considering all the other things the Triple-A has on its hands. We try to be watchful, to see that our codes follow the general intent of NRA, which administers all other codes. The relationship between total payrolls and farm prices is so remarkably close and constant that we

are naturally sympathetic with the effort to raise wages and lengthen payrolls, under the Blue Eagle. Our participation in the codes for agricultural industries gives us, however, the chance to see that the farmers' interests are protected, and that in the general restoration of purchasing power, the towns do not again get too far out ahead of the farms. A working balance of national buying power, expressed in the Parity principle of the Farm Act, is the goal of the Triple-A in everything it undertakes.

Once we have managed to reduce our burdensome stocks of the crops that we used to export in quantity, our problem of maintaining an internal balance of spending power between agriculture and industry, our major producing groups, will perhaps become more clear-cut and plain, though not, perhaps, less difficult. For a long-time program of agricultural adjustment, our aim should be the highest possible standard of living for all our people, and for the greatest possible contribution not only of our farms but of all our other land to the national welfare.

A good deal of land unfit to farm is all right to live on. Throughout this country, people are farming where they ought to be living in small homesteads, sustained by part-time or full-time work in decentralized industry. Scrubby crops are growing in regions which ought to be reforested and made refuges for recreation and game. You have read, perhaps, of the workers' homestead experiment, sustained by decentralized industries, which M. L. Wilson is heading; and of the President's recent appointment of a committee for the restoration of wild life. In an exploratory report now nearing completion this committee points, I am told, to certain areas where if farming were abandoned completely, and game induced to multiply naturally, as it once did there, the total food production of the area would probably be greater than it is now, under a scratch system of patch farming, and widespread overgrazing.



I mention this simply to suggest that there are other aspects of our land problem than those I have time to deal with, specifically, in this paper; and that all aspects, those which deal with farming and those which deal with a new pattern of American living, will have somehow to be drawn together and correlated.

To return to the immediate problem of reorganizing our farmland to produce in accord with paying demand: as far as a fixed, irrevocable plan is concerned, we are at the moment in a position of indecision. How can we plan for long-time production until we know far more definitely how many people we are trying to feed? Are we going to be more world-minded or more nationalistic? Are we going to lower tariffs, accept goods in some measure from abroad, and thus make it possible for our farms to produce in some measure for the world again? Or are we going to follow the cramped, suspicious, nationalistic trend now everywhere prevailing; keep up tariffs; regiment our farms and industries more and more to tense, denying limits of production; and strain every nerve and fiber of our being in a closely regulated effort to "live at home"?

Secretary Wallace has raised this question insistently. "A planned middle course," he said recently, "is possible and practical, provided we do not make the phrase "middle course" a further excuse for loaning more money abroad in a vain effort to sell more abroad without buying more there. There is no painless path out of our troubles. We must weigh the pain and risks of nationalism against the pain and risks of renewed international dealing; set up marks that will stand for generations; and strike our course accordingly. Until we know where we are headed as a nation, we can not know how to plan for the long pull."

Secretary Wallace makes no secret of his own belief that farmers would do well to insist on lower tariffs. He thinks that the pain of a completely

regimented nationalism would be perhaps unendurable to agriculture, which under nationalism would suffer a permanent contraction far greater than would industry. He does not, from his knowledge of the American farmer, picture him as happy plowing limited licensed fields, with his Governmental permit to do so tacked up on a post. I, myself, feel that as the rigors of a constricted agriculture appear more plainly our farmers will be perhaps more willing to think about tearing down the tariff walls around protected industries and certain agricultural specialties, and blowing off some of the pressure of surpluses by reciprocal trade abroad. The pain of a tightly-drawn nationalism upon our agriculture would be real, and, strangely enough, American business men, with shipping or international banking interests, are apparently also beginning to feel the strain. Ogden Mills' remarks about the tariff at Topeka Monday were by no means as reverential as one would have been led to expect by his political precedents. It may be that as to tariffs we are in for a general change of heart, and that America may in time plan to farm, in some part, for the world again. But until that shows plainer signs of happening, the only sensible thing for our agriculture is to lay its plans on the basis of domestic consumption, plus the actual surviving dribble of exports; and adjust these plans upward, if circumstances demand.

Plans based principally on domestic consumption must in themselves, as I want now to show you, be kept rather widely elastic. The figures I am going to put before you, and the comments, are again largely the work of Dr. Elliott. They are tentative figures, the first result of our initial approach to this question of consumption standards and long-time plans for our agriculture.

Probably, as logical approach as any is to start with the level of consumption of food in the United States during the prosperous period of 1925-29, and determine the acreage of land required to supply that food. With

this level of consumption, approximately 284 million acres of crop land at average yields would be required to supply the food of our present population of about 125 million people.

Of this acreage the equivalent of 280 million acres were actually grown in the United States in that period. The additional 4 million acres represent the acreage necessary to produce our net imports of sugar and other minor food products. In addition to these products, we of course import considerable quantities of edible vegetable fats and oils, as well as practically our entire consumption of coffee, tea, spices, and bananas.

If we make our estimates in terms of the level of food consumption obtaining during the depression period, 1932-33, we find that almost exactly the same acreages would be required. There, however, is this very important difference--the prices which the farmers received for their products during the depression period were very, very much lower than during the other period--a consequence which is of great importance to the nation as well as to the farmer.

In 1932 and 1933, the food products of approximately 23 million average acres went into export trade or into the piling up of excess stocks in this country. In contrast, the products of an acreage approximately 50 percent larger or 34 millions were devoted to the same use in the prosperous period, 1925-29. It also should be noted that the products going into export channels during the earlier period brought a much higher price.

Up to this point we have been talking in terms of actual levels of consumption. Let us now turn to a consideration of the acreage that would be used to feed our population, if we followed some diets which have recently been suggested by the research workers in nutrition in the Federal Bureau of Home Economics.

They have recently set up and described 4 scientifically balanced diets at different levels of nutritive content and cost. The first diet is a

restricted diet for emergency use. This diet provides about 2,675 calories per capita per day, and is made up largely of the cheaper foods such as wheat flour, corn meal, and other cereals, dried beans and peas, with reduced quantities of fresh fruits and vegetables, milk and other dairy products. As suggested by the name, the quantities of food allowed are close to the minimum and are not recommended for use over extended periods.

The next two diets are the adequate diet at minimum cost and the adequate diet at moderate cost. These two diets provide about 3,000 calories per day and have a vitamin content of 50 to 100 percent greater than the restricted diet. They also provide for a much smaller consumption of cereal products and a corresponding increase in the consumption of dairy products, vegetables, and lean meat. As indicated by the name, the adequate diet at moderate cost is further removed from the restricted diet than the adequate diet at minimum cost. It provides for a more liberal consumption of milk, meat, and certain of the vegetables and fruits.

The fourth diet which is termed, A Liberal Diet, provides about the same number of calories as the other diets. It, however, provides for an even smaller use of cereal products and an increased, very liberal use, of lean meat, eggs, milk, tomatoes, vegetables and fruits.

If we calculate the acreage necessary to supply our present population with the products called for in these diets, we find that the adequate diet at moderate cost would require approximately 278 million acres, or exactly the same acreage as required by our 1932-33 level of consumption and only slightly less than that required by the 1925-29 level. The restricted diet would require only 145 million acres, and the adequate diet at minimum cost 223 million acres. The Liberal Diet, on the other hand, with its emphasis upon meat and dairy products, would require more than 300 million acres in

crop land and also some increase in range and pasture area above the amount we now have.

Although the adequate diet at moderate cost would require almost the same acreage in food crops as was necessary to supply our requirements at the levels of consumption for 1925-29 or 1932-33, the distribution of the acreage among the various crops is decidedly different. For example, the per capita consumption of cereals such as wheat flour, corn meal, rice, etc., called for in the diet are approximately $1/3$ less than our actual consumption, 1925-29. The consumption of sugar called for is approximately $1/2$ of our present consumption. If this particular diet were followed, and we lost all our exports, it would be necessary to reduce our wheat acreage 8-10 million acres, and our other cereals, used directly for food, a proportional amount. On the other hand, such a shift would require an increase of more than a million acres in our truck crops, and somewhat less than 4 million acres in fruit crops. Likewise it would necessitate a reduction of about 25 per cent in our slaughter of beef cattle and an increase of approximately 70 per cent, or 15 million head of dairy cows. The slaughter of hogs would remain approximately unchanged.

Should the Liberal diet be followed these changes would be still more radical. Cereal acreages, for direct food consumption, would be further reduced; beef cattle slaughter would be increased 30 per cent above 1925-29 level; hog slaughter 60 per cent above the dairy cow numbers 70 per cent above. It is apparent, therefore, that if either the adequate diet at moderate cost or the Liberal diet were followed, very pronounced changes in our present agricultural production would be necessary.

To fill in the complete picture, we also need to consider the non-food crops, especially cotton, flaxseed and tobacco. Thus to the total of 284 million acres required for domestic consumption of food products at the 1925-29 level of

consumption, we need to add 32 million acres of non-food crops to obtain the total crop acreage needed for domestic use of both food and non-food products. In contrast with the 32 million acres of non-food products for domestic consumption in 1925-29, only 24 million acres were used for the same purpose in 1932-33.

In the same period the food and non-food products from approximately 57 million acres were either exported or accumulated as excess stocks in the United States. Of this acreage approximately 23 million acres represented food crops, and 34 million acres non-food crops.

These calculations do not take into account wool, and hides. Inasmuch as hides are a by-product of animal production, and wool largely a range and pasture product, changes in production of either would not directly cause a substantial increase in crop acreage.

To summarize: During 1928-32 we harvested approximately 360 million acres of land in crops in the United States. Assuming that we continue to import sugar, flaxseed and other products as in the past, of this 360 million acres there would be required approximately 275 to 280 million acres to produce enough food crops to maintain our present population at a level of food consumption equivalent, either to that enjoyed in the relatively prosperous period, 1925-29, or the "adequate diet at moderate cost" suggested by the Home Economists.

To supply our domestic consumption of non-food products under analogous conditions, an additional 30 million acres would be needed. This leaves 50 to 55 million acres of harvested crop land of average productivity to go into exports, into accumulated stocks, to be devoted to the replacement of products we now import, or to be retired from production. To this 50 to 55 million acres of harvested crop land must be added the acreage of crop land which is left unharvested because of price, weather, or other cause, and acreage in idle and in fallow land. In 1929 approximately 10 million acres were left unharvested be-

cause of crop failure and another 40 million acres were let lie idle or were in fallow.

Thus the Agricultural Adjustment Administration is faced with a two-fold problem. We must first attempt to see that the production of the various crops for domestic use are distributed on the 395 to 310 million acres necessary for that purpose, in such a way as to maintain a proper balance among them. We must, in the second place, attempt to allot and control production on the 50 to 100 million acres of the remaining crop land, which usually goes into export or is allowed to remain idle or fallow, in such a manner as to obtain a maximum advantage or income from export trade, without, at the same time, piling up excess stocks of American products to depress our domestic prices.

I should like in closing this paper, which has mainly tried to indicate general directions, to say a little something about our probable order of march on the new trails. Will it continue, in the old-time pioneer manner, a voluntary march, a march in which no one has to join if he doesn't want to; a march, indeed under which the laws and tenets of the land now permit those who don't want to come along to stay right where they are and snipe, economically, at the organized marchers? Or will we, in terms of a new social and economic pioneering, call voluntarily and insistently for a new sort of social discipline; an order of march wherein everyone has to join, or at least refrain from sniping, if a large majority decide that the time has come to march all together, as one?

My own view is that we must come in the end to the second order of march. I base this view in part upon a considerable experience in cooperative marketing. California, as you know, got started earlier on cooperative marketing than did most other states; and the development of cooperative marketing there has been quite elaborate. Always, however, there as elsewhere, the last ten or 20 per cent who won't cooperate prevent the movement from getting beyond a certain point. Years before cooperative production control began to be widely

talked of, many in California had come from its advanced cooperative marketing experiments to the conclusion that any kind of cooperation, if it is to realize its true possibilities of progress must bluntly take this view: Voluntary sign-ups are not sufficient. We have got to come to something where everybody cooperates, if most of us want to cooperate. I, myself, am entirely of this conviction; but I add this reservation: An overpowering demand for increased degrees of compelled cooperation must grow up from the ground, and be strong enough to withstand the onslaughts of unwilling minorities. To try prematurely to tighten the controls from the top would be dangerous, and it might be fatal.

In the South and elsewhere farm leaders are insisting that their people are ready and eager for compelled cooperation on production adjustment now. Eight or nine state farm organizations have passed resolutions to that effect. We are being pressed with demands from the cooperating 80 or 90 per cent to license the non-cooperators, or tax them for increasing output; and in this way hold them in line. I favor the principle; I wish I could entirely believe we are ready for it; but I suspect at times that farm leaders are not able to speak for all the farmers, including the exceedingly unprogressive; and I doubt whether, if we went ahead with this idea of compulsion full-blast now, we could make it stick.

There are, roughly, two degrees of compulsion suggested. The first idea is, if we have a sign-up campaign and some don't sign up, the Secretary should license the non-signers, or so tax them, that they will find it to their advantage to sign a contract and accept an acreage or breeding allotment along with everybody else.

The second proposal would not make non-signers reduce their production with the rest, but simply refrain from increasing it.

The second course is obviously more moderate; I hope we are ready now to go that far; but I am not entirely sure of even that. Neither is Secre-

tary Wallace. He has addressed a questionnaire to 50 thousand southern farmers and farm leaders on these two questions. When we get the returns on that, we may have a little more light. Whatever the answer, I think it would have very little to do with the immediate program of the AAA; it will merely be another ray of light on the way forward.

Before we move too far toward a strict regimentation of production, we must be very sure that the people really want it; and whether in asking for it, they really know what they are asking for. I know parts of this country where you could at present no more enforce strict crop licensing than you could have enforced Prohibition at 42nd Street and Fifth Avenue, New York. In other parts of the country, I believe that people are really about ready for it.

The system of agriculture, whether tightly compelled, or widely disorganized, that the people of this country finally decide they want, is, I feel certain, the system they will get in the end. At present, I find no sentiment for throwing off all controls and sliding back into the jungle of unlimited laissez-faire. A war on a boom might again unleash our hardy and ungovernable pioneer spirit to that extent; but I think not. We have learned a hard lesson. Working our way toward social control, we shall have other hard lessons to master; but none, I think, harder than those we would have to meet all over again if we chose to move again down the backward path.

I believe that the thousands of now separate county adjustment associations we are setting up as a vital link in our present program, will take a more coordinated form, and become county production adjustment councils for all farm enterprises within each county; and exert in time a powerful influence toward sensible and daring national agricultural planning. I do not believe that the great body of intelligent American farmers will, with the promising new

machinery for social control now in their hands, permit their business over again to plunge into utter chaos and disorder.

What the farmers want is what they will get. No everhead organization that we could possibly set up in Washington to these ends; no hopeful excess of overhead persuasion, could possibly carry through any of these hard new programs, without the whole hearted support of farm people.

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